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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF WENDY JO ) 
ROBERTSON AND NICHOLAS : 
IAN ROBERTSON. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action based on an Order to Show Cause, issued 
at the behest of the Appellants, directed to the Respondent, 
why the Respondent should not be adjudged to have abandoned and 
deserted her minor children, Wendy Jo Robertson and Nicholas Ian 
Robertson, why the Respondent's rights as the natural mother 
should not be extinguished, and why the Petition for Adoption 
of Appellants should not be granted. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court below, Honorable GEORGE E. BALLIF, Judge, sitting 
without a jury, found that the Respondent had not deserted her 
children and ordered the Appellants' Petition for Adoption 
dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment of the trial 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent essentially agrees with the Statement of Facts 
set forth by Appellants, except such statement fails to disclose 
that Respondent offered to controvert and dispute the testimony 
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proffered by Appellants with respect to matters preceding the 
divorce decree, should the Court have admitted the same 
(Tr. 51, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71); that Respondent was informed 
about the children from time to time and such information 
indicated that the children were being adequately cared for by 
the Appellants (Tr. 19, 38, 44); and that the Respondent did 
not contact the children between the time of the divorce decree 
in April 1971 and July 1975, when efforts to contact them were 
made by the Respondent, because of a serious accident and in-
juries to her in March of 1971, which rendered her physically, 
emotionally and financially unable to assume any meaningful 
relationship with such children any sooner (Tr. 23, 36, 37, 44). 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD 
NOT DESERTED HER MINOR CHILDREN. 
While in an equity action such as this, the Court on appeal 
is authorized to review the evidence and the Findings of the 
court below, those Findings will not be set aside, 
"Unless it manifestly appears that the trial court 
has misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence." 
(STANLEY vs. STANLEY, 97 Utah 520; 94 P. 2d 465) 
In the matter now before the Court the ultimate question 
is whether or not the Respondent deserted her children within 
the meaning of the law so as to obviate the necessity of her 
consent to the adoption of such children by another (R. 72, 73) 
(Section 78-30-5 UCA 1953 as amended). This Court on previous 
occasions has held that "deserted" means: 
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"An intentional abandonment, rather than a separation 
due to misfortune or misconduct". 
MAn intent to sever all correlative rights and duties 
of the parent-child relationship". 
(IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF JAMESON, 20 Utah 2d 53, 432 P. 
2d 881; WORTHEN vs. WALTON, 123 Utah 380, 259 P. 2d 881). This 
Court has further held, as set forth in the last above mentioned 
cases, that proof of the intent to desert must be shown by clear, 
convincing and indisputable evidence, and that such burden of 
proof is on the party claiming desertion. 
Appellants have not borne the burden of proof required 
of them in this matter. Their only competent evidence in support 
of desertion by Respondent is that Respondent failed to contact 
the children from the day of the divorce between her and 
Appellant, Nicholas M. Robertson (April 13, 1971, R. Ex. #1), as 
alleged in the Petition for Adoption (R. 73), and July 1975 
when Respondent did attempt to make contact (Tr. 15). Respondent 
has explained this lapse of time as being due to a serious motor-
cycle accident which befell her on March 30, 1971 (Tr. 33) with 
the following consequences to her: 
(a) Respondent was hospitalized for several weeks imme-
diately after the accident, including the period 
when Appellant Nicholas M. Robertson obtained a 
default divorce (R. Ex. #1, Tr. 34). 
(b) Respondent's injuries consisted of a cerebral con-
tusion, fractures of the jaw, fractures of the neck, 
fracture of the left femor, and multiple lacerations 
(R. Ex. #2, Tr. 34). 
(c) Respondent has undergone continual medical treatment 
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since such accident, including at least two periods 
of hospitalization for additional surgery incident 
to the injuries sustained and at the time of trial 
was still receiving treatment for the fractures to 
her jaw (Tr. 34, 36). 
(d) Respondent experienced serious emotional difficulties 
as a result of the accident and did not sufficiently 
recover to a point where she felt able to cope with 
responsibilities which would be incident to her 
renewing an association with her children until the 
summer of 1975 (Tr. 36, 37, 44). 
(e) Respondent, because of said accident, became heavily 
in debt for medical expenses which amounted to approx-
imately $8,000.00 (R. Ex. #2, Tr. 35). 
(f) Respondent did not receive any compensation for her 
injuries until June of 1975 when she received a settle-
ment of some $50,000.00 from a lawsuit instituted as 
a consequence of her accident, which settlement per-
mitted her to satisfy her medical debts and put her 
in a financial position where she could effectively 
meet obligations which would arise from a renewed 
association with her children (Tr. 37). 
The foregoing circumstances and conditions do offer a 
reasonable explanation for the failure of respondent to contact 
her children, particularly in view of the fact that she knew 
they were being adequately cared for (Tr. 19, 38,44), and that 
she wanted to put herself in a more stable position before try-
ing to undertake caring for the children herself (Tr. 44). The 
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evidence is clear that the Respondent did think of and have 
concern for her children and did not intend to desert them. The 
trial court so found after having the opportunity to note the 
demeanor of Respondent on the stand (R. 32, 33). 
Appellants cite the case of GREENER vs. GREENER, 116 Utah 
571, 212 P. 2d 194, as authority for the proposition that in 
this case the appellate court is in just as good a position as 
the trial court to judge the evidence, but on the contrary, the 
case now before the Court is one of those referred to by this 
Court in GREENER, whereby it held: 
"In cases in which the emotions of the parties are apt 
to influence their testimony, the opportunity to observe 
them in the court room and especially on the witness 
stand is of great importance". In such cases "we must 
rely largely on the trial judge to resolve the conflicts". 
The trial court, after hearing all the evidence, found no intent 
on the part of the Respondent to desert her children. Appellants 
have made no showing that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against such finding by the trial court, and consequently, such 
finding should be sustained (NOKES vs. CONTINENTAL MINING AND 
MILLING COMPANY, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 594). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING, ON THE BASIS OF 
IMMATERIALITY, ALLEGED EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT PRIOR 
TO THE DATE OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Appellants' contentions that the proffered testimony, 
excluded by the court, concerning Respondent's actions prior to 
the divorce decree, had a significant bearing upon the question 
of desertion, are without substance. During the entire period 
prior to September 1970, with respect to which Appellants wanted 
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to offer testimony, the Respondent had the children with her, 
she took the children with her to Kentucky, refused to bring 
the children back to Utah, and only relinquished them to the 
Appellant, Nicholas M. Robertson, after a struggle and after 
Appellant had caused Respondent to be jailed (Tr. 11, 12, 48, 
49). Respondent's failure to return to Utah with Appellant, 
Nicholas M. Robertson, was not an abandonment of her children, 
but a refusal on her part to continue to live with a man whom 
she no longer could tolerate. Such conduct in no way demon-
strates desertion, but on the contrary, clearly shows that 
Respondent asserted her interest and rights in such children 
until such children were forcibly taken from her by the Appellant, 
Nicholas M. Robertson. 
All of the other alleged sordid conduct which Appellants 
wanted to attribute to Respondent, even if true, and which 
Respondent denied, could only go to the issues of the children's 
welfare and the fitness of the Respondent to have custody thereof. 
As this Court has previously held, the welfare of the children 
is immaterial in adoption cases until the fact of desertion 
within the meaning of the adoption statute has been shown by 
clear and convincing evidence. (WORTHAN vs. WALTON, supra; 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF MAESTAS, 531 Utah Reporter 492, 
531 P. 2d 492; IN RE LEASE, 169 P. 816 [Washington]). 
The decree of divorce (R. Ex. #1) obtained on a default 
basis by Appellant, Nicholas M. Robertson, and based, no doubt, 
on the alleged shortcomings of the Respondent, nevertheless con-
firmed Respondent's rights of visitation with respect to such 
children, which provision Appellant said he insisted upon (Tr. 57). 
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In fact he wanted to reconciliate with Respondent in spite of 
the alleged reprehensible conduct he would now attribute to her 
(Tr. 57). Such position taken by him then with respect to the 
Respondent and the children is exactly the opposite of that 
which Appellants now urge upon the Court. 
Appellants' proffered testimony may have been material to 
the issues pertaining to grounds for divorce or the welfare of 
the children, but it has nothing significant at all to do with 
the issue of desertion, and the court below was correct in so 
holding. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have failed to sustain their burden of showing 
desertion of said children by the respondent by clear, convincing 
and indisputable evidence and the judgment of the court below 
should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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